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1. Introduction 
The argument about decentralization has been repeated in our country since 1970s. 
Although the political background has changed recently , decentralization seems to be 
gaining support among many people. Namely , in 1970s , local government was a strategic 
footfold , but in 1980s the plot of conservatizm vs. progressivism collapsed , so that it was 
not a disputed point politically. However , at present , decentralization is highlighted 
again. The main reasons for this tendency are as follows. First of all , the size of governｭ
ment in our country during the postwar period has expanded rapidly. This is especially 
true for social security expenses. Therefore , the accumulative budget deficit has taken up 
as an embarassing problem. Secondly , powerful bureaucracy has emerged especially in 
central government as the size of government expands. Such an emergence of bureaucｭ
racy has deprived local government of its authority , so that each local government has 
standardized. 
As everybody knows , decentralization denotes the transfer of authority from central 
government to local government. From the viewpoint of economics , however , it matters 
whether the size of government is controled by decentralization. Namely , whether decenｭ
tralization give rise to the intergovernmental competition or not is a matter for argument. 
The purpose of this paper is to survey the relations between economic theories and deｭ
centralization and to show the influence of decentralization on allocation of resources and 
government size. The paper is organized as follows. In section I we present the model 
that denotes the relationship between decentralization and allocation of resources. In 
sections II and IV we survey some theoretical and empirical studies for decentralization 
and government size. Finally , in section V we provide some conclusions. 
1. Decentralization and Optimum Allocation of Resources 
The decentralized economy which we will consider in this section is an economy that a 
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consumer can freely move among regions with seeking the higher level of utility. In 出is
case , it matters whether the decentralized economy satisfies the Pareto optimum or not. 
If it satisfies the Pareto optimum , central govemmemt will not have to intervene local 
govemment. If not so , central govemment will provide ample room to intervene local 
govemment. In order to grasp the e部ence of this point , therefore , we would like to 
model formally the relationship between the decentralized economy and the Pareto 
(1) 
optimum. 
We will start from two symmetrical regions. The number of the population (n) is 
assumed to be constant. The population of region 1 isrepresented by nl and that of 
region 2 isrepresented by n2. The constrained condition of the population is: 
n=n)+n2 (1) 
The production function of region i (i=l , 2) is !(ni) (i=l , 2) and the marginal proｭ
ductivity of labour is assumed to diminish gradually. Moreover every resident living in 
regions 1 and 2 ishomegeneous , he or she consumes private goods (the price is 1) and 
public goods (the marginal cost is 1) and has 仕le same utility function u = U (Ci , g i) (i = 
1 , 2). On the other hand , the constrained condition of resources is: 
f(n))+f(n2) 
=n)c) +g) +n2c2+g2 (2) 
If every resident can move freely，出enthe level of utility between regions 1 and 2 will be 
出e same. N amely , this is shown by the following equation: 
U(c) , g) )=u(c2, g2) (3) 
Under the circumstances , the Pareto optimum conditions can be get by attempting the 
following optimum solution. 
max U (c 10 g) } 
s. t n)+n2=n 
f(n)} +f(n2} =n) c) +g) +n2c2+g2 
U(c) , g)}=u(c 2, g2} 
(4) 
The optimum solution of equation (4) can be solved with ease by the Lagrange's 
method. This method can be formularized as follows: 
max : L ( c) , C2 , g) , g 2 , n) , n 2 , il) , il 2 ， λ3} 
=U(CIo g) }+il) (n-n)-n2}+il) (n-n)-n2) 
(5) 
( 1) Tiebout (1954) pointed out that the provision of public goods can satisfy the Pareto optiｭ
mum through “ voting with your feet". The framwork of this section is mainly dependent 
on Mansoorian , A. and G.M. Myers (1997) and Richter , W.F. and D. Wellisch (1996). 
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+À.,{f(n 1) +f(n,) -n1c1-g1-n,c ,-g,} 
+λa{ u(c 1 ， gl )-u(c" g ,)} 
where λ 1> À2'λ3 represent the Lagrange's undetermined multipliers. The first-order conｭ
ditions of (5) can be shown by: 
δL 穹 一一=一一 (1+ À. 3 )- À.， n 1 =0 (6) δc 1 磴 1 
δLθu 一一=-À.， n ，-À. 3 一ー =0 (7) θc ， δc ， 
。L 穹 一一=一一一(1 +λ3)- À.， =0 (8) 。glδgl
。Lδu
一一 =-À.，-À. 3 一一 =0 (9) âg, " "0 âg, 
θL =- À. l- À.，(笠-c1)=0穗 1 .., .., ¥穗1 (10) 
。L =- À. l- À.，(笠 -c，)= 0 δ n ， .., "'\ân , (11) 
。L
(12) 一一 =n-n ， -n ， =O。 À1 111 '1 
。L
δ À.， =f(n1 )+f(n,)-n1c1-g1 = 0 (13) 
θL (14) 一一 =-n， c ， -g， =O。 À3 ''2... 2 
Putting eqs. (6) 一 (14) in order , we can get the Pareto optimum conditions as follows: 
l=n ， 色/âg 1
aθ u/δc 1 
1 ヮ δ u/θg，=nヮーー一一一ーム。 u/θc ，
df . df 
d~-"l- dn , -'" 
n=n1+n, 
f(n1) +f(n ,) =n1C1 +gl +n,c ,+g, 
U(C1 , gl)=U(C"g,) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
Equations (15) and (16) represent the optimum conditions of the provision of public 
(2 ) 
goods. The left-hand side means the marginal cost of public goods and the right-hand 
side does the benefit of them. In equation (17) , df / dn i (i = 1 , 2) -C i (i = 1 , 2) represents 
the marginal social net product of labor (二MSNPL) with respect to region i (= 1 , 2). It 
( 2) Eqs. (15) and (16) are the corresponding Samuelson Rule for the efficient provision of 
local public goods. 
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Figure 1. The Size of Optimum Population (1) 
df/ dn ,-c , df/dn2-c2 
is the optimum condition of the population share that the value of MSNPL between two 
regions is the same. This is illustrated in Figure 1. In this Figure , if the MSNPL with 
respect to region 1 exceeds the MSMPL in region 2 as the location point A , the inflow of 
population from region 2 to 1 will take place. This process will continue til it comes to 
吐le point E. If仕le MSNPL with respect to region 2 exceeds the MSNPL in region 1 , then 
the phenomenon to the contrary will take place and so that the population size will be 
equilibrated on the point E. As mentioned above，廿le Pareto optimum conditions in two 
symmetrical regions are represented by eqs. (15) 一 (20) . 
In this model , it is dependent upon the degree of utility whether the resident should 
move from one region to the other or not. Therefore , we should like to define the point 
at issue with the indirect utility function. If we a部ume 出at the labor will equal the rate 
of wage. Therefore , the total amount of wage can be represented by n; (df/ dn;). Furｭ
出er ， let us define the rent as f (附) -n; (df/ dn;) , as a simplifying assumption. The per 
capita income of the resident's isrepresented by: 
!(ni) d!. R 
一一一一一=一一一ー・←-ni dni. ni 
(21) 
where R stands for the rent and we will a部ume 出at it is equally distributed to 出e
residents. On the other hand , the budget constrained condition of the resident is: 
!(ni) _. gi 一一一一 =Ci+ 一一
ni ni 
Therefore , we can fomulate the optimum question of the resident as follows: 
max : u (c ;, gi) 
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s.t. :f(n;)/ni=Ci+g;/ni (i=1 , 2) 
Solving the question (23) , we can get: 
1 穹/稟 -=一一一一~ (i= 1, 2) 
ni âu/θ Ci 
(23) 
(24) 
Equation (24) means that the per capita marginal cost of public goods equals the marginal 
rate of substitution of public goods for private goods. Therefore , we can get the optimum 
condition of the resident by adding equations (22) and (24) , and thus the optimum 
amount of public goods (gf) and private goods (cf). 
The optimum amount of public goods and private goods can be represented as a funcｭ
tion with respect to the population (ni) (i=l , 2) as follows: 
C ,* =C ,* (ni) 
g ,* =g,* (ni) 
(25) 
(26) 
Equations (25) and (26) are called the demand function. Sustituting these for the utility 
function , we can obtain the following equation: 
U引戸pi gtj (27) 
Further , substituting (26) for (27) , we can obtain the following indirect utility function 
(v) : 
U(ni)-g,* (ni) 1 
u(nz)=1J , gt} (28) 
V( ・) stands for the level of utility equivalent to each resident , when the optimum amount 
of public goods is supplied. Differentiating equation (28) with respect to the population 
(n i ) , we can get the following equation: 
dv δu/ θ C i (df _ ^ *¥
dni ni \dn i ・ ， ) (29) 
This equation stands for the change in the utility for an additional resident and dv / dni 
stands for the slope of v (ni) . Ifit's value is negative , the population size in region i (i 二
1 , 2) will exceed the optimum population size. If positive , the population size will be less 
than the optimum size. Therefore , the optimum size must meet the condition: v (nl) 二
v (n2) . This is shown by Figure 2. In this figure , the optimum population size is the point 
n* equivalant for the point E. If the population in region 1 changes to 01 n1 and that of 
region 2 changes to 02 nl , some residents in region 2 will move into resion 1. Because the 
level of utility in region 1 ishigher than that in region 2. This movement of population 
between two regions will last til the point E comes into existance. N amely , the point E is 
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Figure 2. The Size of Optimum Population (II) 
v(n ,) v(n2) 
0 ， 1 ・ O 2
n , 
n , 
n 
本n n2 
n2 
the very equibrium point and it's condition satisfies v (nl) 二 v (n2) . 
Here , we would like to consider what implications the decentralized economy model 
has. Althought the model we considered above has some impractical elements , it provides 
some useful points at issue in arguing about decentralization. 
First of all , The movement of residents among regions results in allocation of resources 
( 3 ) 
in the sense of the Pareto optimum. Secondly , if residents move among regions with 
comparing the levels of utility , it will cause local govemments to supply public goods of 
higher quality. Thirdly , Decentralization will be expected to bring about the keen compeｭ
tition among local govemments. Therefore , the size of local govemments will be smaller 
than what it is today. With respect to the govemment size , we would like to deal with in 
sections II and IV. 
111. Decentralization and Public Choice 
To estimate decentralization from the viewpoint of Public Choice is the main point at 
issue in considering politico-economics over decentralization. Because the Public Choice 
theory hopes to display its originality in the analysis of politico-economics. 
Generally , the Public Choice theory tries to explain the activities of central govemｭ
ment. In many cases , it emphasizes that the estrangement from the optimum provision of 
public goods is caused by the democratic system or organization and that the growth of 
( 3) If each region is heterogeneous , this hypothesis will not be realized. For instance , it ﾎs 
true for a different production function and a different fixed amount of land among 
reglOns. 
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government lasts over a long period. From the context of the Public Choice theory , it is 
of importance whether this estrangement can be get rid of by decentralization. 
Some of economists raise objections against whether the abuses of the political process 
in this century 一一- what we call political failure --are positive phenomena as the 
Public Choice theory asserts extremly. This argument has some ideological colors. 
Frankly speaking , the precausions againt the growth of government in the Legan Governｭ
ment , the Thatcher Government and the Nakasone Government were dependent on conｭ
servatism. On the other hand , the standpoint in opposition to conservatism was socialism 
and in the European Continent the influence of social democracy on economic policies is 
( 4 ) 
stil intensified. 
The way of economists' looking at political failure are varied. The methods of the analｭ
ysis -一一 in paticular , the positive analysis --which the public choice theory adopts 
have been acknowleged within the academic world. But many economists belonging to 
the Eastern States (for instance , in Harvard University , MIT , and so on) do not regard 
political failure as questionable. 
The purpose of this section is to take up political failure as a factor of excessive , ineffiｭ
cient activities of government and to examine whether decentralization can remove of 
political failure or not. 
It is said that one of the causes of political failure lies in the bias of bureacracy toward 
the expansion of the public expenditure. Niskanen assumed that bureacrats would maxi-
(5 ) 
mize budgets as a way of maximizing utility. Pay , prestige , power and promotion are al 
assumed to be positive utility sources and to be a direct function of the bureacrat's 
budget. The only constraint which the bureacrat is seen to face is that the total benefit of 
public services to consumer-voters should not exceed the total cost. 
The basic Niskanen model is shown in Figure 3. The total benefit function for the 
median voter (TB) is given as: 
TB=aqー (b/2)q2 (30) 
where a and b are the parameters and q denotes the provision of public services. The 
median voter's marginal valuation (the marginal benefit) is given by V: 
d(TB) v= 一一一一 =q-bq (3D 
dq 
( 4 ) Castle (1982) pointed out that parties of the right may be in favour of an increase in 
expenditures on defence and education , while paties of the left may favour expenditures of 
a social welfare character. 
( 5) See Niskanen (1971). 
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The marginal valuation curve is also the median voter's demand curve. The total cost 
(TC) of providing public service output is: 
TC=cq+dq2 
where c and d denote the parameters. Therefore , the marginal cost (MC) is 
MC=c+2dq 
(32) 
(33) 
The Niskanen-type bureacrat will produce public output where TB= TC , having 
( 6 ) 
negotiated as large a budget as possible. Output in this case is set where q = 2 (α -c) / (2
d+b). This compares with the optimum level of output set at MB=MC; that is , q' 二
(α-c) / (2d + b). A comparison of Figure 3-(a) and 3-(b) shows that the bureacratic 
choice model results in levels of public output and hence public expenditure which are the 
Pareto inefficient. 
By the way , if decentralization makes progre田 and the competition between local 
Figure 3. The Niskanen Model 
TC , TB 
TC 
TB 
(a) 
。 q 
q' q 
MC , V 
MC 
、、ノ?〆L
、
V 
。 q 
q' q 
( 6 ) Ifbureacrats aim at maximizing residents' net benefits , public output will be produced 
where MC=MB. 
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governments is aggravated , the officials of local government will take action towards a 
way of maximizing the net benefit of residents. The bias of bureacrasy in the Niskanen 
model would be relaxed by the competition between local governments. The official 0ぱfa
local governm児en凶t mus坑t be subject to the median voter乍 budget constraint (zω.v+ 砂q=y:
where ω=private goods consumed by the median voter; t=t白he tax share percieved by the 
median v刊ot旬er幻; 1ρり =the price of the goods; q=quantity of public services and y=the median 
voter's income) . He also has no choice but to abide by the rule of budget that 出e revenue 
generated must at least cover his costs (ρq ミ cq where c is 出e perunit cost of public 
services , which is assumed to be constant) . 
As the official will push the median voter's utility down to UO (UO suggests the utility 
associated with zero output and zero budget) , the constraint 
u(ω， q) 注 U O (34) 
will in fact be binding , so that the indifference curve for q (given ωand UO) is: 
q=q(w, UO) (35) 
As the median voter's budget constraint is ω = y -tpq , this can be substituted into (6) to 
glve: 
q=q(y-tE, UO) (36) 
where E=ρq. Given the definition of the net benefit of the median voter (B) , 
B=E-cq(y-tE, UO) (37) 
the slope is: 
âB/âE=l+ctq , 
where ql is the derivative with respect to E. 
Therefore , in Figure 4 , a net benefit-maximizing official will be at the point: 
l+ctq ,=O (38) 
Figure 4. The Trade-Off between Net Benefit and Budget Size 
B 
, , 
, , , , 
, , , , , , , , , , , 
, , , , , 
, , , , 
司~ー、生一n
1 三斗ご二'f
n '" budget -maximizing 
〆E=何 (y-tE， u O )
E 
。
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and a budget-maximizing Niskanen-type model as mentioned above will be shown by: 
E=cq(y-tE, UO) (39) 
In Figure 4 , the initialequilibrium of the official is the point 1 on 1 (where h suggests 
the indifference cueve of the official). As income increases , the net benefit budget funcｭ
tion is pushed out. If仕le official's preferences are homothetic , then a location on the new 
equilibruim will be the point 2 on Tt. This point can not be optimum. Because the official 
can raise his uti1ity by choicing the point 3 which is the point of intersection on the indifｭ
ference curve and the net benefit budget function. 
As mentioned above , in the assumption of maximizing the net benefit , there is the 
trade-off between the net benefit and budget size. If the official tries to maximize the net 
benefit of median voter's towards decentralization , the budget size will be smaller than 
the size of the Niskanen mode1. Namely , the public expenditure wi1 be cut down by the 
competition among local governments. What we must refer to here is 出at smaller local 
governments are realized as the degree of decentralization intensifies. 
IV. Decentralization and Government Size 
Numerous studies have been devoted to the analysis of the relationship between decenｭ
tralization and government size. The best known argument among them is the decentrali-
( 7 ) 
zation hypothesis of Oates. He sugges臼 three points as effects of decentralization on gov-
ernment size. First of all , in the budgetary relationship between central government and 
local govwernment , if the budgetary authority is concentrated on central government , the 
competition among local governments wi1 be obstructed. Consequently , The size of local 
government would expand more and more as well as that of central government. This 
effect is caUed the centralism effect. Secondly , if individual local governments are 
divided on a small scale , their discretion and authority wi1 be restricted by intergovern. 
mental competitions. Therefore , the expansion of local government size would be conｭ
troled. This effect is called the fragmentation effect. Thirdly , the consolidation among 
local governments or the integration of subordinate government into upper government 
does not only cause the expansion of government unit but also the strength of the govern. 
mental authority. N amely , the size of local government wi1 be expected to expand in a 
budgetary sense. This effect is called the consolidation effect. 
The centralism effect as mentioned above indicates the extent to which budgetary 
( 7) See Oates (1985 , 1989). 
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authority concentrates on upper government and to which the size of government expands 
through it. For instance , the ratio of central government expenditure to general governｭ
ment expenditure is regarded as an index of the centralism effect. The higher this ratio 
is , the weaker the degree of decentralization become. Moreover , If the centralism effect 
is large , we will expect the budgetary size to tend to become large. The reasons for it are 
as follows: 
(1) Since the competition does not exist in central government , it exhibits it's authority 
and discretion as a monopolistic unit but not as a competitive unit. 
(2) Central government has more authority over bond issue and taxiation than local 
government has. 
(3) Central government can impose the cost of providing local public goods on the 
whole of society , through logrolling in a political process. (Therefore , the excess 
provision of public goods will take place with ease. ) 
On the other hand , if local governments are subdivided into small units , the competiｭ
tion among local governments will be encouraged further. Consequently , each local govｭ
ernment would lose control of its discretion and operate efficiently. This constrained 
effect of the division of local government on its size is called the fragmentation effect. In 
order to grasp this effect in a positive analysis , substitutional variables such as the 
number and population size of local governments are often utilized. 
乱10st of the positive analyses for the decentralization hypothesis introduce variables 
which represent the degree of fiscal concentration and fragmentation into ad hoc 
functions. For instance , Oates estimates the following regression equation by using cross 
(8 ) 
section data on state governments in the United States. 
R=f(G, F , y , N , [皮， S) (40) 
where R is the ratio of the state and local governments revenue to the state citizen 
income , G is the ratio of the state expenditure to the state and local governments , F is 
the number of local governments , y is the per capita state income , N is the population 
size , UR is the degree of urbanization , and S isthe ratio of the federal subsidies to the 
general funds in the state and local governmen胎.
G, the degree of fiscal concentration , in the above-mentioned equation it is taken to 
give the large size of state government , having a [ +] sign. If F , the degree of fragmenｭ
tation , represents a [-] sign , the size of state governments will be restrained by the 
( 8 ) This regression equation is not derived from a theoretical framwork. Such an ad hoc 
estimated equation seems not to be appropriate to testing a hypothesis. 
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Table L Empirical Examples for the Decentralization Hypothesis 
dependent centralism fragmentatin effect subsidiary 
authors data variables effect effect county borough 
Oates (1985) state cross section LR/SI + 
Nelson (1986) state cross section LR/SI + 
Nelson (1987) state cross section LR/SI + 
Marlow (1988) t匇e ser冾s GE/GNP + + 
Grossman (1989) time series GE/GNP 十 + 
Zax (1987) county cross section CE/CI + + + 
Zax (1989) county cross section CE/CI 十 十
Joulfaian & state cross section GE/SI 十 十
Marlow (1990) 
Notes: 
(*) LR isstate + local governments revenue, SI is state income, GE is general government 巴xpenditure， GNP 
is gross national product, CE is county expenditure, and CI is county income. 
(*) The affirmative (negative) result for each efect has a [+ ] ([ -]) sign respectively. 
intergovemmental competition. N amely , the fragmentation effect could be recognized. 
The Oates estimation , however , has no its significance for either effect and represents the 
negative conclusion for the decentralization hypothesis. 
Various approaches and their tests toward the decentralization hypothesis have been 
attempted since the Oates estimation. As noted in Table 1 , those tests have a diversity of 
results. Because in taking the unit of govemments or in quantifying the size of govemｭ
ments , the analysts respectively use a different index. As for the unit of govemments , for 
instance , Nelson estimates the fiscal centralism effect with respect to the state and local 
(9 ) 
govemments. On the other hand , Marlow and Grossman estimate it with respect to the 
(10) 
federal and state governments. Moreover , Zax proves it in connection wi出 the borough 
(11) 
and county govemments. As for quantifying the size of govemments , Zax and Nelson use 
the size of the state and local govemments expenditures , in contrast to the Oates estimaｭ
(12) 
tion. 
As for the subsidiary effect which is represented by 5 , Grossman proves that the size of 
goverr立nent expands through a decline of regurality in costs and benefits of public goods 
and services , if the ratio of the federal subsidies to the state and local govemments 
(13) 
revenues increases. ]oulfaian and Marlow also conclude that the increase in the federal 
( 9) See Nelson (1986). 
(10) See Marlow (1988) and Grossman (1989) . 
(11) See Zax (1989). 
(12) See Zax (1987) and Nelson (1989). 
(13) See Grossman (1989) . 
- 22-
The Influence of Decentralization on Allocation of Resources and Government Size 
subsidies causes the expansion of government size through the intergovernmental 
(14) 
competitions. 
As mentioned above , the analysts do take hold of explanatary and explained variables 
at a different level. As represented in Table 1 , therefore , there is diversity in their 
emprical conclusions. However , the following points can be pointed out from this table. 
Firstly , the centralism effect tends to be supported in connection with the federal and 
state governments. In particular，出is tendency can be seen in time series analyses. Secｭ
ondly , the fragmentation effect tends to be supported in connection with the county and 
borough governments. We should say 出at the regional competition is easy to take place 
in a narrow area such as a county and borough , but not in a wide area such as a state and 
local government. Thirdly , the estimated results for the subsidary effect are not uniform. 
The reason for it will be because the analysts estimate it at various levels of governｭ
ments. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we considered the influence of decentralization on allocation of resources 
and government size. Then , we made the following points clear. 
(1) If we assume that every region is symmetrical and every resident move freely for 
maximizing his utility , the efficient allocation of resources will be accomplished 
through the interregional competitions. If the above-mentioned assumptions are not 
be realized ，廿le interventions of central government will be approved. 
(2) From the viewpoint of Public Choice , if decentralized governments provide local 
public goods and services at the level of maximizing net benefit of residents , the size 
of governmet expenditures will be smaller than the case of centralized governments. 
(3) According to the Oates-type models , the correlations between decentralization and 
government sizes at various levels are not similar by the analysts. 
As mentioned above , we could complete the conclusion that decentralization controls 
the government expansion at the theoretical levels. However , we can not argue for and 
against 出is conclusion at this stage. Some emprical analyses which are presented in the 
final section are imposed various restrictions on data , and 出ey involve embarassing 
questions in testing the hypothesis strictly. The tasks which ought to be imposed on us in 
出e future , are to develop the theoretical analyses which can discriminate outward 
(14) See ]oulfaian and Marlow (1990). 
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correlations from economic and constitutional machanisms behind them. 
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